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The NetherlandsIn this paper we study the optimal environmental policy of the firm for
different scenario's dependent on (costs of) production technologies, fi-
nancing costs and governmental policy. The governmental measures to be
considered are:
- investment grants on cleaner production technologies and on abatement
activities;
- taxes imposed on environmental pollution.
The problem will be defined as an optimal control model. In this model,
the firm influences its pollution output through the choice of its produc-
tion technology. Available are a more capital-extensive and dirty activi-
ty, a more capital-intensive and clean activity and an abatement activity
that eliminates pollution completely or partially.3
1. Introduction
Nowadays, in the industrialized world the improvement of environmental
quality is one of the most important objectives within the framework of
economic and social policy. From the economist's point of view, the en-
vironment has become a scarce commodity. Consequently, environmental use
is an allocation problem (Siebert [21]) and should be taken into conside-
ration by economic theory. Actually, more and more books are devoted to
environmental economics (e.g. [4], [6], [13], [20], [21], [23]).
At the macroeconomic level a lot of attention has been paid to the analy-
sis of the trade off relation between economic growth and environmental
quality (e.g. C17. C97, C111. C147, C18]. C217. C237, C24]).
The analysis of the effects of governmental regulation on the firm's deci-
sion making concerning pollution control spending, employment and invest-
ment is an important issue at the microeconomic level (e.g. [8], [16]).
The relevant question connected with the strategies of governmental en-
vironmental policy deals with the choice of their instrument(s). One class
of instruments includes direct controls by setting limits to the amounts
of effluent that the factories can discharge into a stream (environmental
standards). The problem of optimally selecting this upper bound and of
selecting a point of time at which it comes into force is analyzed by
Beavis and Dobbs C57. Another mechanism for the attainment of a given
environmental target is the standard-price-approach introduced by Baumol
and Oates C3]. The basic idea of this concept is to meet a given quantity
of emissions by rationing the demand for emission permits by prices.Tr.- reiative zfi"-icien~~~ of standarc.' se:rir:g and emiss'ons tar.ati,~r, i~:
nection with pollution control is analy7ed hy A.3ron [2]. Th~. Fa::- -~..
cx~o.,cts :,ho ~tatic cvmt.,,.~~c~r~ of effluen-: taxes ar.d e;'f'ir-?
standards to a 3ynamic world in which firms invest resources in improving
their abatement tPchr„lcgy as well ~.~ t}.~~i.r rroduction tecrinoi~~gy.
In our paper we deal with the firm's optimal environmental policy when the
government uses pollution tax and investment grants in order to encourage
r`~e use uf cleaner r~-~duction technologies andior abatement activ:~ties.
Under these conditions t.he policy of the firm consists of decisions about
t~:e le~el uf prod~.--~r.á.u.~ .3n,~ t:he chni~~.- of pr,~d~~~tion acti~~i-r
our model not only fix the sales value and production costs, but also the
level of pollution.
We assume that management maximizes the shareholders' value of the firm.
We present the resulting optimal policíes of the firm under different
scenarios. Each scenario is characterized by a different set of values
for: factor productivities, unit costs, price~demand curve, fin~nncing
costs, restriction on the capital structure, governmental instruments on
pollution and profit tax rate.
The problem will be analyzed by developing a dynamic model nf rt,P fi~m,
wi:i ~-. is ar~ extericed versícn o: the or.t described by 'v'an Loon [ 1"j ] Í s~ :~
also [12]). ln Section 2 important assumptions are preser.ted, and in Sec-
tiGn ; tti~ dynamic rvode] of' the firn -.. -~:~;r.rod~iced, In Sèction ;a ,., 1,re-
sent the results snd analyze the optimal poïicies for two different scena--
rios emphasá-zing on economic aspects. `,c~ctior. 5 concludes rhe nanAr ar,d
the ,-~'~.r,~cul u~~3:ysis c~n b2 fouf;d ir, tt:.~ íppendicF~.5
2. Preliminaries
In this section we present important assumptions of the model. These as-
sumptions concern the environmental policy of the government, the way the
firm can influence its own environmental pollution output, the firm's
possibilities to finance its activities and the goal the firm wants to
reach in taking its decisions.
As mentioned in the introduction we incorporate the following governmental
environmental instruments in our model:
- investment grants on cleaner production technologies and on abatement
activities;
- taxes imposed on environmental pollution.
The level of the firm's pollution depends, beside on the level of output,
heavily on the choice of the productíon technology. For simplicity, we
assume that the firm produces only one homogeneous product. We also assume
that at the start of the planning period the firm uses a more capital-
extensive and dirty technology. The firm may consider to replace this
technology by a more capital intensive and cleaner one (see e.g. [157)
and~or to build an abatement installation that eliminates pollution com-
pletely or partially. This choice will depend on the unit costs of the
different combinations of technologies. T'he amount of time the firm needs
to reach its ideal combination is determíned by the level of available
cash flow (from operations and from funding activities). Funding activi-
ties consist of attracting debt money. In this model we assume that there
is a maximum debt to equity rate.6
The level of i~iternal generated cash flow depends on the return on the
invested capital and on the level of corporate profit taxation. We further
assume that shareholders do not demand dividend each year, provided that
management maximizes the value of the firm. This value of the firm con-
sists of the discounted dividend payments over the planning period and the
discounted value of the firm at the horizon date.
The financial situation described in this model holds for many firms:
equity can only be increased by retained earnings and subsidies, which are
apart from profits, and the total capacity of debt financing depends hea-
vily on the (book) value of equity, thus on the value of total assets.
3. The Model
The firm is able to produce a homogeneous output through two different
techniques, a capital-extensive activity and a capital-intensive one:
QÍK1.K2) - q1K1 } q2K2
ql ~ q2
in which:
Kj : amount of capital goods assigned to activity j
Q : production rate
qj : capital productivity of activity j.
(1)
(2)7
Production through these two activities causes environmental pollution,
where activity 2 is relatively more clean than actívity 1. Besides, it is
also possible for the firm to invest in a technique that cleans pollution.
We assume that pollution is homogeneous by nature:
E(K1.KZ.K3) - e1K1 t e2K2 - e3K3
el ~ e2
ql q2
in which:
(3)
(4)
E : amount of pollution
K3 : amount of capital goods assigned to the abatement activity 3
ej : pollution to capital rate of activity j; j- 1, 2
e3 : abatement to capital rate of activity 3
There are no unused capital goods, so all capital goods are assigned to
any of the three activities:
K- K1 t K2 t K3 (5)
in which:
K : capital goods stock
Because the labor to capital rate differs among activities, the firm's
policy also influences the level of employment:8
L(K1,K2.K3) - 11K1 ; 12K2 t 13x3 (6)
11 ~ 12 ~ 13
in which:
L: level of employment of the firm
lj : labor to capital rate of activity j
(7)
The stock of finished products is constant over time, which implies that
at each point of time the level of production equals the level of sales.
If the firm raises output, its (net) selling price will decrease:
S(Q) - P(Q)Q
S'(Q) ~ 0; S"(Q) ( 0; S(0) - 0
in which:
S : sales rate
P : (net) selling price
(8)
(9)
In this model the only asset is capital goods which can be financed by
equity and debt. The value per unit of a capital good is fixed at one unit
of money. So the balance sheet equation is:
X` Y- K1 ' K2 } K (10) 39
ín which:
X : stock of equity
Y : stock of debt
The firm can raise its equity by retained earnings and by acquiring in-
vestment grants. However, equity reduces through tax imposed on environ-
mental pollution (which cannot be deducted from profit before taxes):
X- R t g(I2t13) - f2E (11)
in which:
I. : investment rate assigned to activity j J
R : retained earnings rate
fZ : pollution tax rate
g: investment grant rate on the cleaner activity 2 and on the
abatement activity 3
To construct the profit and loss account-equation we introduce the follo-
wing assumptions:
- corporate tax is proportional to profit;
- depreciation is proportional to the stock of capital goods;
- borrowing does not carry any transaction costs.
Then the flow of retained earnings can be formulated as:10
R - (1-fl)[S - wL - aK - rY] - D (12)
in which
D : dividend rate
a : depreciation rate
fl : corporate profit tax rate
r: interest rate on debt
w : wage rate
For each technology the usual formula of net investment applies:
1{~ - I~ - aK~; J- 1.2.3
The amount of debt is bounded from above (see [1~]), i.e.:
Y 5 kK b Y 5 lkk X
0 5 k ( 1
in which:
k: maximum debt to capital rate
(13)
(14)
(15)
Assume that the firm behaves so as to maximize the shareholders' value of
the firm. This value consists of the sum of the discounted dividend stream
over the planning period and the discounted final value of the firm at the11
end of the planning period. This final value is equal to the difference
between the final value of the assets and the sum of the final stock of
debt and the amount of investment grants that have to be repaid due to
stopping corporate activity:
z
maximize f e1TD(T)dT t e1z[K(z) - Y(z) - g(KZ(z) t K3(z))]
D.I1.I2,13 0
in which:
T: time, 0 s T s z
i: shareholders' time preference rate
z : horizon date
To complete the model, we add some non-negativity conditions:
D 2 0, Y Z 0, X z 0, E z 0, K1 2 0, KZ 2 0, K3 Z 0
(16)
X(~) - X~ ~ 0. K(~) - K1(~) - KD ~ 0 (18)
The controls D and Ij (j - 1, 2, 3) do not need to be explicitly bounded
from above, because they have an impliciet upperbound induced by the mo-
del's financial structure.
As we will show later on, it is convenient to distinguish between diffe-
rent cases, depending on the mode of production, the financial structure12
and the dividend pay out rate. For each case, we denote the resulting unit
cost by:
cbn, b E{1,2,12,13,23,123}; n E{X,Y,YX,XD,YD}
in which:
(19)
b: activity performed by the firm (e.g. b- 123 means that the
three activities are performed together)
n: index of financial structure and dividend pay out rate:
n - X : self-financing case
n- Y : maximum debt financing case
n- YX : intermediate debt financing case
n- XD : self-financing case together with a positive dividend
pay out rate
n- YD : maximum debt financing case together with a positive
dividend pay out rate
The firm never performs only activity 3 because of its non-productivity.
Due to the following assumption it is not optimal to pay out dividend in
the intermediate debt financing case:
i ~ (1-fl)r (20)
This assumption indicates that the capital market is imperfect (see also
[177).13
We further assume a sufficiently small initial value of capital goods, so
that it is optimal to grow at the start of the planning period while at-
tracting a maximum amount of debt:
S'(Q(0)) ) max cbn, b E{1,2,12,13,23,123}; n E{X,Y,YX,XD,YD}
(21)
We exclude solutions that are now well defined by assuming:
cbn ~ cjm, b, j E{1,2,12,13,23,123}; n, m E{X,Y,YX,XD,YD} (22)
To limit the number of possible solutions we assume that under all cir-
cumstances productivity per unit equity of activity 1 is greater than
productivity per unit equity of activity 2(notice that activity 3 is non-
productive), which is ensured by the following two inequalities:
(1-g)el . e3 q1 ~ (1-g)(e2fe3) q2'
(1-k-g)e13t (1-k)e3 ql ~ (i-k-g)(e2te3) q2 (23)
The first inequality of (23) implies that productivity per unit equity of
activity 1 combined with activity 3 exceeds the productivity per unit
equity of activity 2 combined with activity 3 in the case of no pollution
and zero debt financing. To see this consider first the left hand side of
this inequality. If K1 and K3 are financed by one unit of equity it holds
that K1 t(1-g)K3 - 1(gK3 is paid by the government as investment14
grants). No pollution in case of a combination between the activities 1
and 3 requires that e1K1 - e3K3 (cf. (3)). From these two equalities we
e
obtain that K1 equals (1-g)ei } e and this amount of K1 is able to pro-
3
e3
duce (1-g)el t e ql (cf. (1)). A similar reasoning can be applied to
3
obtain the expression of the right hand side of the first inequality of
(23).
The second inequality of (23) has the same meaning as the first one, but
it concerns the case of no pollution and maximum debt financing. Due to
(4) it is easy to derive that the conditions in (23) imply that producti-
vity per unit equity of activity 1 is greater than productivity per unit
equity of activity 2 in the self-financing case and no cleaning activities
q2
(i.e. ql ~ 1-g) as well as in the case of maximum debt financing, where no
capital goods are assigned to the abatement activity (~1 ) q2 ).
1-k 1-k-g
In Appendix 1 we show that the model can be simplified into a model that
contains 2 state variables, 4 control variables and 9 restrictions. In
Appendix 2 we present the necessary conditions for an optimal solution,
which are derived by using Pontryagin's maximumprinciple. We also explain
in what way these conditions are transformed into the optimal trajectories
of the firm.
4. The firm's optimal trajectories
The optimal policy of the firm depends on the scenario in which it has to
operate. From the optimal solution, 16 different scenarios can be discer-
ned, each asking for a different optimal policy of the firm. 5uch a policy15
causes an expansion of the firm during which growth and consolidation are
alternating stages. If the planning horizon is far enough, these 16 poli-
cies lead to 8 different final stages. Which of these final stages is the
optimal one depends on 3 characteristics of the scenario: financial costs,
technology and environmental policy of the government.
Financial costs.
Main issue here is whether cost of equity is larger than cost of debt
(including its tax advantage), so:
i ~ (1-fl).r (24)
If debt is cheaper in the relevant scenario, the firm will finance its
activities in the final stage with as much debt as possible. If equity is
cheaper, which scenario is not purely hypothetical due to the assumption
of the capital market being imperfect (see equation (11)), the firm will
pay back all its debt before entering the final stage.
Technology.
To characterize a scenario ít is important to know the relation between
the unit costs of both technologies:
)
c1XD ~ c2XD (Z5)
1 í fz
c1XD - ql wll t a} 1-fl } 1-fl e1J16
c2XD - 1 wl }(1-g- fl g)a f(1-g) 1; f2 e q2 2 1-fl 1-fl 1-f2 2
These unit cost formulas, derived from the optimality conditions, thus
include such costs as: wages, depreciation (adjusted for tax and invest-
ment grants), financing costs (in a situation of financing with equity
only) and environmental taxation costs. All these kinds of costs affect
the proportion between both unit costs. In that way these costs determine
whether it is more profitable, in the final stage, still to produce by
means of the old, less clean production technology 1 or to switch before
that stage to production technology 2. Notice also that the environmental
policy of the government (i.e. fixing f2 and g) influences the relation-
ship of
c1XD and c2XD. A more rigorous interpretation of such unit cost
formulas will be presented in the next two subsections.
Environmental policy.
The impact of the governmental policy on the pollution of the firm in the
final stage of its development is described in the optimality conditions
through the next inequality:
~ f2
~3 ( 1-fl e3
in which:
(26)
c3 - w13 t( 1-g- lff g)a i(1-g)1-f
1 1The left part of (26) are the costs per dollar invested in the cleaning
technology 3. Given the technological possibilities, government may de-
crease these cleaning costs by raising the investment grant rate g. The
right part of (26) is the decrease in environmental tax due to lower pol-
lution of e3 per dollar invested in technology 3. In a scenario with a
government stressing on environmental features such as a high investment
grant rate g and~or a high environmental tax rate f2, the ~ sign may hold
for (26). In that case, it is worth while for the firm to install a clea-
ning technology in the final stage of its development.
As stated in the begínning of this section, the signs of (24), (25) and
(26) fix the final stage towards which will lead the optimal policy of the
firm. Different stages of growth and consolidation may precede this final
stage. In the next subsections we describe two patterns towards two diffe-
rent final stages. In that way we are able to demonstrate some more in-
teresting features of the optimal solution. In Subsection 4.3 the total
set of the firm's optimal trajectories is presented.
4.1. The firm's optimal policy under a weak environmental policy of the
government.
Here we analyze a scenario, for which the following conditions hold:
financing costs: i ~ {1-fl)r (2~)
technology: c1XD ~ c2XD (28)18
f
environmental policy: c3 ~ 1-f e3 1
(29)
The firm's optimal policy to be studied in this subsection is depicted in
Figure 1. This figure shows that the firm starts with maximum borrowing in
spite of the fact that debt is the expensive way of financing. The reason
is that marginal sales exceed the unit cost, even if capital stock is
financed by debt money, and so each additional capital good, bought by
means of debt money, yields a positive income. This can be shown as fol-
lows: in the beginning of the planning horizon it holds that Q is less
than Q1YX (cf. (21)), where:
,
S Q1YX - c1YX (30)
in which:
f
c1YX - q wll } a} 1-f el
1 1
[Place Figure 1 about here]
We now discuss the above formulation of
c1YX
in more detail. The part
between brackets is the cost per capital good assigned to activity 1, when
this capital good is financed by debt money only. It is divided by the
output per capital good, ql, in order to obtain the unit cost of activity
1. The cost per capítal good consists of four parts:19
wages
depreciation : a
cost of pollution : f2e1~(1-fl)
interest on debt : r
The components that contain the costs of wages, depreciation and debt are
obvious, so they do not need any further explanation. About the cost of
pollution component we can argue that el is equal to the amount of pollu-
tion per capital good. The pollution is taxed with rate f2, but it is not
allowed to subtract this tax payment from the firm's profit before paying
profit tax. Therefore the tax payment due to the pollution per capital
good assigned to activity 1(f2e1) has to be multiplied by the factor
1~(1-fl).
Having explained that
c1YX
equals the unit cost, where the Firm uses acti-
vity 1 and the relevant capital good is financed by debt money, we can
conclude from (30), from the concavity of S(Q) and from the fact that Q is
less than
Q1YX, that on the first expansion path marginal sales exceed the
unit cost, where capital stock is financed by debt money:
S~(Q) ~ c1YX (31)
As soon as Q reaches
Q1YX
we get an equality between marginal sales and
c1YX
(cf. (30)). Now, due to the concavity of S(Q), further expansion
would imply that marginal sales fall below marginal cost, where capital
goods are financed by debt only, and therefore it is optimal for the firm
to pay off debt first before growing any further. After all debt is paid
off a new expansion phase begins, but now growth is financed by equity20
only. At the end of the planning period the firm pays out dividend, while
reducing investment to replacement level. This phase begins when Q equals
Q1XD' for which it holds that:
~
S Q1XD) - c1XD
in which:
f
c1XD - 1 wl t a t 2 i
ql 1 1-fl el ; 1-fl
(32)
c1XD is the same as
c1YX,
except that the term i~(1-fl) has replaced r.
i~(1-fl) is the desired marginal rate of return to equity before paying
profit tax. From (32) we can conclude that the firm starts paying out
dividend when the marginal rate of return to equity exactly equals its
desired rate. On the expansion path before this dividend path the marginal
rate of return to equity is higher than i~(1-fl) and therefore it is opti-
mal for the firm to grow at its maximum on this phase.
It is clear that this solution can only occur if:
c1XD ~ c1YX'
and it is
not difficult to derive that this inequality equals the financing costs
condition (2~).
Another striking characteristic is that during the whole planning period
the firm keeps on producing by using the most dirty activity. Obviously,
the government's environmental instruments, i.e. the pollution tax rate f2
and the investment grant rate g on cleaner investments, are not suffi-
ciently strong that it is optimal for the firm to exchange a part of its21
growth for producing output by using cleaner production activities. This
is confirmed by the environmental policy condition (29) and also by the
technology condition (28).
4.2. The firm's optimal policy under strong environmental measures of the
government.
In the scenario to be studied in this subsection the following conditions
are satisfied:
financing costs: i ~ (1-fl)r
technology:
c1XD ~ c2XD
f2
environmental policy: c ( e
3 1-fl 3
(33)
(34)
(35)
The solution in this case is presented in Figure 2. Due to (21), here it
is also optimal to start growing by using the capital-extensive dirty
activity 1, while attracting maximum debt. When time proceeds, marginal
sales decrease due to concavity (Q increases so S'(Q) decreases), and,
therefore, at a certain point of time it could be the case that the higher
capital productivity of activity 1 does not counterbalance anymore the
higher costs per capital good due to pollution of activity 1.
[Place Figure 2 about here]z2
One of the possibilities to reduce the costs is to replace the capital
goods of activity 1 by those of the cleaner capital-intensive activity 2.
This will happen as soon as the marginal rate of return to equity of acti-
vity 1 becomes equal to the marginal rate of return to equity of activity
2. The expression of the marginal rate of return to equity of activity 1
under maximum debt financing is:
llk Iql S'(Q) - wll - a -
1-fl
el - kr
f2 J
(36)
Within brackets we have the marginal rate of return to capital goods. A
part of the capital goods is financed by debt, i.e. Y- kK (cf. (14)), and
therefore the interest cost per capital good equals kr. To transform the
marginal rate of return to capital goods into the marginal rate of return
to equity we have to divide the whole thing by 1-k, because it holds that
X - (1-k)K.
The marginal rate of return to equity of activity 2 under maximum debt
financing equals:
1 f
1-k-g q2 S'(Q) - w12 -(1 -~-la -
1-fl e2 - kr (37)
If the firm invests in the cleaner production activity 2, it receives an
investment grant g from the government. Between the main brackets of ex-
pression (36) depreciation appears net from investment grants. These sub-
sidies may be considered as diminishing the price of capital goods at a23
rate g, resulting in a decrease of depreciation of ag in the case of ab-
sence of corporation profit tax. When corporation profit tax is intro-
duced, we have to reckon with the fact that investment grants are free
from corporation profit tax, so the relevant decrease of ag is Chen after
tax payments and this equals a change of depreciation before taxes of
ag~(1-fl). Due to maximum debt financing and the investment grants only
(1-g-k) per unit capital is financed by equity, so we have to divide the
marginal rate of return to capital goods by 1-g-k to obtain the marginal
rate of return to equity.
As mentioned before the replacement of the capital goods of activity 1 by
those of activity 2 will happen when the margínal rates of return to equi-
ty are equal. This holds for Q- Q12Y, and this value can be obtained by
equalizing (36) and (3~):
S~(Q12Y) - c12Y
in which:
1 k-fl
c12Y - (1-k)q2 - (1-k-g)ql
((1-k)12-(1-k-g)11)w
} 1-fl ag t
t gkr t ((1-k)e2-(1-k-g)el)1-f
'
1 f2 I
(38)
After the capital goods of activity 1 have been replaced by those of acti-
vity 2, the firm starts growing again but now by using the relatively
clean activity 2. When time proceeds marginal sales again decrease and24
therefore the marginal rate of return to equity will also decrease
(cf. (37)). If the pollution tax rate f2 is relatively high, after some
time it may be worthwhile to stop further expansion (and thus more pollu-
tion) and to start investing in the non-productive abatement activity 3,
while keeping the investment in capital goods of activity 2 at replacement
level. This policy stops as soon as the abatement capacity is that high
that the pollution, caused by production through activity 2, is elimi-
nated. The marginal rate of return to equity under maximum debt financing
and where the activities 2 and 3 are combined such that there is no pollu-
tion, can be expressed as:
1 I e~ -~12e~ 13e2 1 - r ~-l
1-k-g Lq2s~(Q) e2~e3 e2fe3
} e2}e3J
w Ill -
1-f1Ja - krl (39)
Due to the absence of pollution, the marginal rate of return to equity
does not contain any pollution costs. From (3) we obtain that the elimina-
tion of pollution implies that e2K2 - e3K3. Within the main brackets we
have the marginal rate of return to capital, which implies that this is
the extra profit that arises due to the application of an additional capi-
tal good. From this capital good e3~(e2te3) is assigned to activity 2 and
e2~(e2te3) to activity 3.
The investment in the abatement activity starts as soon as the marginal
rate of return to equity of activity 2(cf. (37)) equals the marginal rate
of return to equity, where the activities 2 and 3 are combined such that
there is no pollution (cf. (39)). Hence, the value of Q for which these
rates are equal can be obtained by equalizing (37) and (39) and is denoted
by Q~3:25
S'(Q~3) - c23
in which
1 f2
c~3 - q2 w(12-13) } 1-fl (e2te3)~
(40)
Notice that the amount of debt financing does not have any influence on
the value of c~3, because c23 does not contain an interest component.
Therefore, the argument that indicates the way of financing is dropped.
After the abatement capacity has reached such a level that all pollution
is eliminated, a new expansion phase starts in which a part of the retai-
ned earnings is invested in the abatement activity so that the amount of
pollution remains zero. The continued expansion leads to a further decrea-
se of the marginal sales. Therefore, after a while it will be optimal for
the firm to reduce its costs by paying off the expensive debt (cf. (33)).
This will happen as soon as the marginal rate of return to equity
(cf. (39)) equals the interest rate on debt:
1 g I ~ - (12~ ~l ~l l
1-k- ILq2s~(Q) e2,e3
Ilez}e3 } e2}e3J
w- rl -
1-flJ
a-krJ
- r(41)
Growing any further, while still using maximum debt financing, would re-
sult in a fall of the marginal rate of return to equity below r. This
implies that it is better for the firm to use the marginal dollar for
paying off debt than for expansion investments. Therefore it is optimal to26
pay off debt first before growing any further. If we write Q~3YX for Q,
expression (41) can be rewritten into:
s'(Q23Yx) - ~23Yx
in which:
r e l e t e
c~3YX - ql w112 t e3 13J
~((1 -~la t(1-g)rl~ 2 l ll J J ~.
(42)
After all debt is paid off, a last expansion phase begins which lasts
until the marginal rate of return to equity equals the marginal rate of
return desired by the shareholders:
1 f -~ - ( 1?~ ~l ~l l i
1-g Lq2S' (Q) e2,e3
Ile2}e3 } e2}e3Jw
-(1 - 1-f1J
aJ
- 1-fl (43)
From (43) we can obtain that for the optimal production rate, which we
denote by
Q23XD, it holds that:
S~(Q23xD) ~ ~23xD
in which:
(44)
e e ~e l
c - w 1 f- 1 l t ( ( 1--~ a t(1-g) -~ 23XD q2 2 e3 3J ll
1-fl, 1-fl, 2e3 J
'During this final stage the retained earnings are used for replacement
investment and for paying dividend to the shareholders.
In this subsection we described a situation in which the government's
environmental policy is strong enough to force the firm to replace first
the capital goods of the dirty activity, and second to eliminate the re-
maining amount of pollution, still caused by production through the clea-
ner activity, by investing in a non-productive abatement activity.
The technology condition (34) and the environmental policy condition (35)
indicate that it is possible for such a solution to be optimal. However,
to avoid any confusion we repeat that the conditions (33). !34) and !35)
are only useful to determine the optimal policy in the final interval.
They do not provide any information about the way this final interval is
reached. To state this differently, the final policy of investing in acti-
vities 2 and 3, only financed by equity, can be preceded through several
patterns of intermediate stages. This is shown explicitly in Figure 3 of
the next subsection.
4.3. The total set of optimal trajectories of the firm.
The optimal trajectory of the firm depends on the values of the parameters
such as the tax rates, investment grant rate, the labor to capital rates,
etc. Each set of parameter values fixes a ranking of the unit costs. In
Figure 3 it ís shown in what way such rankings correspond to the firm's
optimal trajectories.
[Place Figure 3 about here]28
Due to (21) the firm starts in each trajectory with growing at its maximum
by using activity 1 and maximum debt financing. In Figure 3 this feature
is pointed out by stating "lY" in the upper square. The optimal policy in
the next phase depends on the relationship between the unit costs
c1YD'
c1YX, c12Y
and c13Y. This is pointed out by stating "max(c1YD' c1YX' c12Y'
c13Y)" in the diamond below the upper square (see Figure 3). If
c1YD
has
the maximum value of these four unit costs it is optimal for the firm to
pay out dividend, while keeping investment at replacement level, as soon
as the production rate is such that it holds that:
S'(Q) - c1YD
If, in stead of paying out dividend when the production rate satisfies
(45), the firm would go on with expansion investment, the marginal rate of
return to equity then falls below the rate desired by the shareholders, so
this is not optimal.
In a similar way we can argue that after a while it is optimal to pay off
debt if
c1YX has the largest value, to replace the capital goods of acti-
vity 1 by those of activity 2 if
c12Y
has the largest value and to start
investing in the non-productive abatement activity 3 if c13Y has the lar-
gest value. Now, it is not difficult anymore for the reader to interpret
the rest of this figure by himself. The trajectories treated in the Sub-
sections 4.1 and 4.2 are pointed out by the solid lines. From "the bottom
of the tree" it can be derived that there are sixteen different optimal
trajectories, each of which ends with a phase where the firm pays divi-
dend. Of course it must be assumed here that the planning period is suffi-
ciently long so that the final phases can be reached.29
The expressions of the unit costs, that appear in Figure 3 and which are
not presented in the paper, can be obtained from the authors upon request.
5. Conclusions
In this paper the optimal policy of a profit maximizing firm is studied
for different scenarios, depending on the costs of available production
and cleaning activities, financing costs and governmental policy. The
governmental instruments consist of a tax rate on pollution and investment
grants that reward investments in capital goods by which the production
process leads to less pollution. The problem is analyzed by developing a
deterministic dynamic model of the firm which is solved by applying stan-
dard control theory. The firm's production process is described by activi-
ty analysis (e.g.[1~], [22)).
As in Van Loon [1~] the firm's optimal trajectories consist of different
phases. Each growth phase is followed by a stationary phase on which the
firm replaces capital goods oF one production activíty by those of an-
other, the firm pays off debt or the firm pays out dividend. On such a
stationary phase the production rate is fixed by an equality between mar-
ginal sales and the unit cost. The explicit formulation of such a unit
cost shows how its value depends on the investment grant rate and the
pollution tax rate. Hence, by knowing the explicit formulations of the
unit costs the government can easily derive in what way a particular
change in its environmental policy influences the firm's optimal trajecto-
ry and thus the amount of pollution caused by the firm, the firm's employ-
ment capacity, etc.30
As a topic of future research we can think of developing a differential
game between the government and a representative firm where the govern-
menL's objective consists of maximizing a utility function over time,
where utility depends on the amount of pollution and the employment capa-
city of the firm. In this way the pollution tax rate and investment grant
rate can be determined endogenously. A similar kind of research is carried
out by Gradus [10], who studies the influence of the government's taxation
policy on the optimal dynamic firm behavior within the framework of a
differential game.
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Appendix 1. Reconstruction of the model.
We introduce the following new variables:
K :- K1 t ( 1-g)(K2tK3) (A.1)
I :- I1 t (1-g)(I2t13) (A.2)
3 3
C:- (1-fl)[S - F w1.K. - rY] t f ï aK. - f E (A.3) 1 i 2
j-1 ~ ~ i-1
i-n which:
K: The value of the capital goods stock financed by the firm's
own profit
I: rate of investment financed by the firm's own funds
C: cash flow after interest and taxes
After substitution of the above variables in the model, given by equations
(1) through (18) in Section 3, we can obtain the following simplified
model:
maximize fz e-iTD(T) } e-1z[K(z) - Y(z)] (A.4)
K2,K3,D,I ~
subject to34
Y- I t D- C
e1K t[e2 - ( 1-g)el]K2 - [e3 t(1-g)el]K3 z 0
k[K t gK2 t gK3] - Y z 0
K - (1-g)(K2tK3) z 0
K2 z 0; K3 2 0; D Z 0
Y 2 0
Y(0) - K(0) - g[K2(0) t K3(0)] - XO ~ 0; K(0) - K1(0) -
KO ) 0
in which:
(A.5)
(A.6)
(A.7)
(A.8)
(A.9)
(A.10)
(A.11)
(A.12)
Q(K.K2.K3) - 91K ' C92 - (1-g)91]K2 - 91(1-g)K3 (A.13)
L(K.K2.K3) - 11K . [12 - 11(1-g)]K2 t (13 - 11(1-g)]K3 (A.14)
E(K.K2.K3) - e1K . [e2 - (1-g)el]K2 . [e3 , (1-g)el]K3 (A.15)
C(K.K2.K3.Y) - (1-fl)CS - w11K t35
- w[12 - (1-g)11]K2 .
- w[13 - (1-g)117K3 - rY] t
~ fla[K t gK2 t gK3] - f2E
(1-g)el t e3 ql ~ (1-g)(e2te3) q2'
(1-k-g)el~{ (1-k)e3 ql ~ (1-k-g)(e2te3) q2
(A.16)
S:- P(Q)Q~ S'ÍQ) 2 0 S"(Q)~ 0 (A.18)
a,fl,f2,g,i,k,r : constants with values between zero
and one (A,19)
e~,l~,q~,w,z : constants which are greater than zero (A.20)
The simplified model contains two state variables, K and Y, four control
variables, K2, K3, D and I, one pure state constraint, and six constraints
that each contain at least one control variable. Finally, we have two
initial conditions represented by (A.12).36
Appendix 2. Solution procedure.
We can derive the necessary conditions for an optimal solution by using
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. After applying the direct adjoining ap-
proach ( see e.g. [~]) the Lagrangian becomes:
L- e-iTD } w(I-aK) t W(ItD-C .~ 1 2 ) 1(e1Ki[e2-(1-g)el]K2t
-[e3t(1-g)el]K3) t~2(k[K.gK2tgK3] - Y) t A3(K-(1-g)(K2tK3)) t
t a4x2 t~5x3 t~6D t a~Y
in which:
(A.21)
wi : co-state variable belonging to the i-th state variable, which
is continuously differentiable
aj : dynamic Lagrange multiplier belonging to the j-th restric-
tion, which is piecewise continuous.
From Corollary 6.3b of Feichtinger and Hartl C7] it can be derived that
the co-state variables really are continuous, because due to the proper-
ties of the paths treated later on it will turn out that entry to~exit
from a boundary arc of the state constraint always occurs in a non-tangen-
tial way.
After some rearranging, the Lagrangian leads to the following conditions:
wl ' ~2 - 0 (A.22)37
e-iT t w2 ~ a6 - 0 (a.23)
f
~1 - -(e-iT}~6)(1-fl)
91S'(Q) - wli- a -
1-flel - ~lel - a2k - ~3
(n.z4)
Y'2 -
(e-iT~~6)(1-fl)r t ~2 - a7
f ag
(e-iTt~6)(1-fl)
( 92-(1-g)91)S'(Q) - w(12-(1-g)11) t llf
1
- f2(e2-(1-g)el)J
i
f ag
(e-iT~~6)(1-fl)C-ql(1-B)S'(Q) - w(13-(1-g)11) 4 llf .
1
- al(e3 t (1-g)el) - ~2gk . ~3(1-g) - ~5 (A.27)
f2(e3}(1-g)el)J
~1 ~ 0. al(e1Kt(e2-(1-g)el)K2 - (e3t(1-g)el)K3) - o (A.28)
J~2 ) 0, ~2(k[K t BK2 4 BK37-Y) - 0
a3 ~ o. ~3(K-(1-B)(K2}K3)) - o
1 - fl
(a.25)
f
1- f --al(e2-(1-g)el) - a2kg t a3(1-g) - a4 (n.26)
(A.29)
(A-3o)
a4 ) 0, a4K2 - 0 (A.31)38
~5 ~ o, a5x3 - o
a6 ~ o. a6D - 0
a~ ~ 0 , a~Y - 0
W1(z) -
e-iz
W2(z) -
-e-iz
(A.32)
(A.33)
(A.34)
(A.35)
(A.36)
We can transform the conditions into the optimal trajectories of the firm
by applying the "iterative path connecting"-procedure designed by Van Loon
[1~]. The procedure starts with determining the feasible paths. Based on
the fact that the Lagrange multipliers aj(j - 1,~) can be positive or
zero, each path is characterized by a combination of positive a's. How-
ever, some of these combinations are infeasible, e.g. a2 and ~,~ cannot be
positive at the same time, for this would imply that the value of Y equals
its upper- and lower-bound at the same time (cf. (A.29) and (A.34)) and
this is not possible. In Table 1 we present the feasible paths and their
economic features. The mathematical derivations of these features and the
expressions of the c's are available from the authors upon request.
[Place Table 1 about here]39
To find the optimal trajectories, we start at the horizon date z, and work
backwards in time. Hence, we first select those paths that may be Final
paths. From substitution of (A.35) and (A.36) into (A.22) and (A.23) we
obtain that a6 - 0 at the end of the planning period. From this we derive
that the paths 4, 5, 9, 10, 18, 19, 25 and 26 may be a final path
(cf. Table 1).
Next, we have to start the coupling procedure to construct the optimal
trajectories. To see if two paths can be coupled we test whether the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
- continuity of the state variables K and Y;
- continuity of the co-state variables wl and
w2;
- continuity of the stock of equity X.
The coupling procedure starts by selecting paths which can preceed the
final path and proceeds backwards in time. It stops when the set of fea-
sible paths is empty.
Finally, we check if the sequence of paths satisfies the initial condi-
tions. In this case they consist of (A.12) and the assumption that the
firms starts producing by using the capital-extensive dirty activity (see
Section 2).
Application of the above described procedure leads to sixteen different
feasible solutions, from which some of them are treated in Section 4. A
survey of the complete solution and its mathematical derivation can again
be obtained from the authors upon request.40
List of Symbols
Kj : amount of capital goods assigned to activity j
Q : production rate
q. : capital productivity of activity j
J
E : amount of pollution
ej : pollution of capital rate of activity j; j- 1,2
e3 : abatement to capital rate of activity 3
K : capital goods stock
L: level of employment of the firm
,Lj : labor to capital rate of activity j
S : sales rate
P : (net) selling price
X : stock of equity
Y : stock of debt
Ij : investment rate assigned to activity j
R : retained earnings rate
f2 : pollution tax rate
g: investment grant rate on the cleaner activity 2 and on the abatement
activity 3
D : dividend rate
a : depreciation rate
fl : corporate profit tax rate
r: interest rate on debt
w : waQe rate
k: maximum debt to capital rate
T : time4i
i: shareholders' time preference rate
z : horizon date
K: the value of capital goods stock financed by the firm's own profit
I: rate of investment financed by the firm's own funds
C: cash flow after interest and taxes
Wi : co-state variable belonging to the i-th state variable, which is
continuously differentiable
aj : dynamic Lagrange multiplier belonging to the j-th restriction, which
is piecewise continuousFigure and table captions.
Figure 1. The firm's optimal policy when debt money is expensive (i C(1-
fl)r) and the government's environmental measures are weak.
Figure 2. The firm's optimal policy when debt money is expensive (i ~(1-
fl)r) and the government's environmental measures are strong.
Figure 3. The firm's optimal trajectories depending on the unit costs.
Table 1. The feasible paths.~ U, K, E, Q, Y
Q1XD I
-y
Q1Y` ~
KQ
w-.~
0
T
F; ~.t~. ~Q K1. E. Y. ~. K3. K2. Q
z3xD
0 z
F í ~yt.~-`t1 2~zxo
,
c23
z3x
~,3xo
,YO R R,xo R ~ zxo ÍI R 23xo II I 13xD 23XD
2YD
2VD
tzv
MAX(C2YD.C2VX.C231'
~2Yx
2YX
C2xD
23X
zxo 23XG
1 C23
27Y
C~Yp C23YX
23vx
23YD 23x0
MAX ( C73vD. Ct3vX. Ct23v 1'
C13vD Ct3YX C,~Y
t3YX t23Y
Ct3XD
t3XD
C123X
123X
23xD
C23YD IC23YX
23 YX
23vo ~~ z3xopath ~1 a2 a3 X4 X5 ~6 a K1 K2 K E Y D Qa 7 3
1 0 0 o t . t 4 t o o t o 0
2 0 f 0 t } t 0 t 0 0 t kK 0
3 0 0 0 , t . o t o o t t 0 lYX
4 0 0 0 t t o t ~ 0 0 t 0 t 1xD
5 0 t 0 t t 0 0 t 0 0 t kK t lYD
6 0 o t 0 4 t t 0 . 0 t 0 0
7 o t 4 0 t t 0 0 t 0 t kK 0
8 0 o t o t t o 0 t o t t o 2Yx
9 0 o t o t o t o t o t o t 2xD
10 0 t t 0 { 0 0 0 t 0 f kK . 2YD
11 0 0 0 0 t . . . t 0 t 0 0 12X
12 0 t 0 0 t t 0 t t 0 t kK 0 12Y
13 0 0 0 . o . t . o t t o 0 13x
14 . 0 o t o 3 f t 0 . o 0 0
15 0 4 o t 0 4 0 t 0 t t kK 0 13Y
16 i t 0 f 0 t 0 t 0 r 0 kK 0
17 t o o ~ o t o t o t o t o 13Yx
18 t o o t o o t t o t o o ; 13xD
19 t t o t o 0 o t o t o kx . 13YD
zo 0 o t o o t t o . . t o 0 23
21 . o t o o . . o . t o 0 0
22 0 t . 0 0 t 0 0 t t ~ kK 0 23
23 t t t o o f o o t t o kx o
24 t o } o o t o o . t o t 0 23Yx
25 t o t o 0 o t o t f 0 0 4 23xD
26 4 . t 0 0 0 0 0 . t 0 kK ~ 23YD
27 4 0 0 0 0 . t . t f o 0 0 123x
28 4 t 0 0 0 t o t ~ t o kx o 123Y
Table 1
a lYX in the column below Q means: S'(Q) - c1YXi
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